Wow, a new post. That blog post about pirates and the USN was a little intense for a layman (and landlubber) such as myself, but ever since these pirate attacks started kicking up, I was wondering when we were going to start taking it a little more seriously, or whether we'd just leave it up to other countries that perhaps have an equal or greater interest in keeping that area of the ocean safe from shipping to take on the responsibility.
On an unrelated note, I see that the Republicans are voting on their "na, na, na, na, na, na, na, na LEADER" (to paraphrase Homer) today. Does anyone else find it a little coincidental that in a party that doesn't have more than a handful of elected officials at any level that are black, and which abhors affirmative action as a general principle, two of the five top candidates for RNC leader and arguably the favorite (Steele)are black? It reminds me a little of when that guy who was married to "7 of 9" from Star Trek Voyager dropped out of his Senate race against Obama a few years back because of scandal, the Republican braintrust decided that the best person to fill in for him as Senator from IL was Alan Keyes, a man who was woefully short on IL cred (having never lived there) and elective office experience (having never held one), but conveniently high on melanin count in his skin considering his opponent.
Discuss.
Friday, January 30, 2009
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Not At All Like Jack Sparrow
I think the return of piracy as a global issue has shocked most people and who can really blame them. After all, we have a romanticized Hollywood vision of what piracy is. We associate it with names like Blackbeard, Captain Blood and think of terms like "swashbuckler" and "buccaneer". The sad truth is that piracy never vanished but has actually maintained a persistence presence in key parts of the globe. Piracy has thrived in South East Asia, reared its head in Latin America and has absolutely exploded in the Horn of Africa. I find it slightly more than humorous that the USN is in 2009 filling one of its original missions that necessitated its return in 1805 after being disbanded after the revolution.
The following is a blog posting from the US Naval Institute page. http://blog.usni.org/?p=753
Observing The Establishment of CTF151
The US Navy has established a new multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The name of this new task force is Combined Task Force 151 (CF-151). Despite the previous rhetoric otherwise from 5th Fleet and the political forces in Washington, including Condoleeza Rice at the United Nations, this is the first tangible action taken by the United States Navy to address the piracy problems emanating from Somalia. Previous efforts have consisted solely in information sharing and assistance response to mariners under threat. These are my observations of the political, tactical, and strategic thinking behind this action by the US Navy.
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) will operate from the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) which will act as a command ship, and initially will be supported by two unnamed warships. It will be interesting to see what kind of helicopters we see flying off the USS San Antonio (LPD 17), we have recently seen AH-1s and UH-1s on the flight deck (click image above and look at it in hi-res), and it will be interesting to see if it becomes Marine airmen who become the sharp end of the spear. I also noted the announcement that the Boxer ESG will deploy Friday, which includes both the USS New Orleans (LPD 18) and the new UH-1Y Huey’s. Go back and read my conversation with Expeditionary Strike Group 5 leadership, including the transcript of the whole conversation. The announcement today puts a lot of that conversation in context, making me think they kind of knew this was coming. As a consistent vocal fan of the San Antonio class, this is exactly the scenario that I have so often discussed this ship… as the flexible sea-air-land nGW maritime domain command ship (mothership). It will be interesting to observe whether reality confirms or discredits my theories through this implementation.
One final note on this, the Boxer ESG only has 2 warships and 1 Coast Guard Cutter. If this ESG replaces the Iwo Jima ESG in the 5th Fleet operating theater, the net effect is a reduction of one warship. It is interesting we are setting up a new command to be resourced by ships at a time the Navy appears to be gradually reducing the number of ships in the region. This could be telling us something about the Navy’s obligations being reduced as it relates to the Iraq war theater.
Depending upon your point of view, or world view, the reasons regarding why the US Navy is developing CTF-151 may very. The Europeans, in particular the Germans, believe this is a reaction to the German Navy taking over command of Task Force 150 next week. The German Navy has a very specific mandate in the region regarding action against piracy, and German command over Task Force 150 coalition forces that take proactive steps to curb piracy could create political problems, and disrupt what has been a very successful coalition effort dealing with other security issues maritime forces are operating to address in the region.
While it is an interesting theory, that would not explain why the US Navy’s commitment to date fighting piracy has been lackluster at best, so it wouldn’t explain why the US Navy decided to all of a sudden take a more proactive approach against piracy simply because Germany is taking command of Task Force 150. The fundamental change here has nothing to do with the Germans, the fundamental change is a shift in strategy towards piracy. Without the decision to adjust the Navy’s fundamental strategic approach to fighting piracy, the US Navy would be quite content operating in Task Force 150 under German command.
I also think CDR Salamander couldn’t be more off the mark with his analysis that this represents the US Navy going it alone in theater. The US Navy has talked tough about piracy and has intentionally NOT done the job of the Europeans in protecting their trade for a long time now. In my opinion, the result of the pirate problem is that pirates have become the solution to developing a multinational approach to solving the difficult challenges in Somalia, and has built the largest collection of warships in the 21st century dedicated to the single purpose of curbing piracy against global trade in a concentrated region. There are 3 Saudi frigates and 3 Chinese ships missing from my last Order of Battle for the 5th Fleet. I’m stunned that the CDR believes as we observe another prerequisite for the framework required in developing a Global Maritime Partnership, he sees it as a sign the US Navy is abandoning the maritime strategy that has so brilliantly shaped these conditions? The patience that has been demonstrated, particularly given the incredibly harsh criticism of the US Navy by so many people on both the CDRs blog and mine, has been extraordinary, and the results in the form of a shared international responsibility against the difficult challenge of piracy has been well worth the wait.
CTF-151 will have a one-star Admiral in command, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, which I think is exactly the right approach towards building this force for the long haul. After all, I suggested it would be the right approach towards coalition building for a multinational approach to piracy back in December after the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1846.
My only concern by the pick of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is that I am surprised the Navy picked an Admiral from the Atlantic Fleet. Expeditionary Strike Group 2, last I heard, was associated with the USS Bataan (LHD 5). I am sure Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is capable, but I was just expecting leadership to come from the Pacific Fleet. Put another way, I expected the Navy to pick someone with experience and familiarity dealing with the PLA Navy.
There is another reason the Navy may be forming CTF-151 besides taking a unilateral approach or because the Germans are taking Command of Task Force 150. This week the PLA Navy entered the action curbing piracy against regional commerce off the coast of Somalia. While the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 might represent the tactical development of an infrastructure to fight the pirate problem originating from Somalia, a problem everyone agrees is on land more than sea; the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 also represents a long term strategy towards the ends of linking the national security strategies of CENTCOM and PACOM looking into the future. Consider for a moment what CTF-151 looks like in the context of an image posted by EagleOne the other day, what I’m calling in the spirit of Thomas Barnett, the Navy’s New Map in the first term of the Obama administration.
The tactical purpose of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) might be to establish “a multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations,” but the strategic purpose has larger ends. Combined Task Force 150 represents a mostly Western approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The nations that contribute to Task Force 150 are European and North American, but also made up of regional partners including Pakistan. If there is any vision behind Combined Task Force 151, the number one priority of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is to build an Eastern approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Essentially, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight priority from day 1 should be to recruit China, Russia, India, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia into CTF-151, all of whom have already committed ships with the intent to fight piracy. If or when Japan and South Korea send ships, recruit them as well.
The US Navy has absolutely nothing to gain in creating maritime competitions in fighting piracy, indeed the Maritime Strategy is about creating maritime coalitions in dealing with maritime challenges. With the creation of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) the US Navy continues to evolve at the pace of the international community towards the development of a cooperative approach to dealing with the problems in Somalia. The strategy here has been absolutely brilliant in my opinion. By not solving the piracy problem for others, a problem that has no economic impact whatsoever to the United States; by encouraging and assisting coalition partners with existing resources; and by remaining patient but engaged in the slowly evolving political process (UNSCR 1846) the United States Navy now finds itself with the internal infrastructure, regional participants, enabled by evolving international political and legal frameworks, and the right tactical resources to address a maritime nGW problem with an international, coalition approach.
For better or worse, the US Navy’s Maritime Strategy has put the US Navy exactly in the position the maritime strategy states it is designed to do. It is now up to our national leadership, both political and inside the Navy, to close the deal with the opportunities at hand. In this bloggers opinion, there is some irony the success in developing a coalition approach to deal with Somalia will fall to the new Secretary of State, one Hillary Clinton. She, more than anyone, understands the challenges of military activities in Somalia. The question is whether that is an advantage, or a burden in the process. Time will tell.
The following is a blog posting from the US Naval Institute page. http://blog.usni.org/?p=753
Observing The Establishment of CTF151
The US Navy has established a new multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The name of this new task force is Combined Task Force 151 (CF-151). Despite the previous rhetoric otherwise from 5th Fleet and the political forces in Washington, including Condoleeza Rice at the United Nations, this is the first tangible action taken by the United States Navy to address the piracy problems emanating from Somalia. Previous efforts have consisted solely in information sharing and assistance response to mariners under threat. These are my observations of the political, tactical, and strategic thinking behind this action by the US Navy.
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) will operate from the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) which will act as a command ship, and initially will be supported by two unnamed warships. It will be interesting to see what kind of helicopters we see flying off the USS San Antonio (LPD 17), we have recently seen AH-1s and UH-1s on the flight deck (click image above and look at it in hi-res), and it will be interesting to see if it becomes Marine airmen who become the sharp end of the spear. I also noted the announcement that the Boxer ESG will deploy Friday, which includes both the USS New Orleans (LPD 18) and the new UH-1Y Huey’s. Go back and read my conversation with Expeditionary Strike Group 5 leadership, including the transcript of the whole conversation. The announcement today puts a lot of that conversation in context, making me think they kind of knew this was coming. As a consistent vocal fan of the San Antonio class, this is exactly the scenario that I have so often discussed this ship… as the flexible sea-air-land nGW maritime domain command ship (mothership). It will be interesting to observe whether reality confirms or discredits my theories through this implementation.
One final note on this, the Boxer ESG only has 2 warships and 1 Coast Guard Cutter. If this ESG replaces the Iwo Jima ESG in the 5th Fleet operating theater, the net effect is a reduction of one warship. It is interesting we are setting up a new command to be resourced by ships at a time the Navy appears to be gradually reducing the number of ships in the region. This could be telling us something about the Navy’s obligations being reduced as it relates to the Iraq war theater.
Depending upon your point of view, or world view, the reasons regarding why the US Navy is developing CTF-151 may very. The Europeans, in particular the Germans, believe this is a reaction to the German Navy taking over command of Task Force 150 next week. The German Navy has a very specific mandate in the region regarding action against piracy, and German command over Task Force 150 coalition forces that take proactive steps to curb piracy could create political problems, and disrupt what has been a very successful coalition effort dealing with other security issues maritime forces are operating to address in the region.
While it is an interesting theory, that would not explain why the US Navy’s commitment to date fighting piracy has been lackluster at best, so it wouldn’t explain why the US Navy decided to all of a sudden take a more proactive approach against piracy simply because Germany is taking command of Task Force 150. The fundamental change here has nothing to do with the Germans, the fundamental change is a shift in strategy towards piracy. Without the decision to adjust the Navy’s fundamental strategic approach to fighting piracy, the US Navy would be quite content operating in Task Force 150 under German command.
I also think CDR Salamander couldn’t be more off the mark with his analysis that this represents the US Navy going it alone in theater. The US Navy has talked tough about piracy and has intentionally NOT done the job of the Europeans in protecting their trade for a long time now. In my opinion, the result of the pirate problem is that pirates have become the solution to developing a multinational approach to solving the difficult challenges in Somalia, and has built the largest collection of warships in the 21st century dedicated to the single purpose of curbing piracy against global trade in a concentrated region. There are 3 Saudi frigates and 3 Chinese ships missing from my last Order of Battle for the 5th Fleet. I’m stunned that the CDR believes as we observe another prerequisite for the framework required in developing a Global Maritime Partnership, he sees it as a sign the US Navy is abandoning the maritime strategy that has so brilliantly shaped these conditions? The patience that has been demonstrated, particularly given the incredibly harsh criticism of the US Navy by so many people on both the CDRs blog and mine, has been extraordinary, and the results in the form of a shared international responsibility against the difficult challenge of piracy has been well worth the wait.
CTF-151 will have a one-star Admiral in command, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, which I think is exactly the right approach towards building this force for the long haul. After all, I suggested it would be the right approach towards coalition building for a multinational approach to piracy back in December after the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1846.
My only concern by the pick of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is that I am surprised the Navy picked an Admiral from the Atlantic Fleet. Expeditionary Strike Group 2, last I heard, was associated with the USS Bataan (LHD 5). I am sure Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is capable, but I was just expecting leadership to come from the Pacific Fleet. Put another way, I expected the Navy to pick someone with experience and familiarity dealing with the PLA Navy.
There is another reason the Navy may be forming CTF-151 besides taking a unilateral approach or because the Germans are taking Command of Task Force 150. This week the PLA Navy entered the action curbing piracy against regional commerce off the coast of Somalia. While the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 might represent the tactical development of an infrastructure to fight the pirate problem originating from Somalia, a problem everyone agrees is on land more than sea; the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 also represents a long term strategy towards the ends of linking the national security strategies of CENTCOM and PACOM looking into the future. Consider for a moment what CTF-151 looks like in the context of an image posted by EagleOne the other day, what I’m calling in the spirit of Thomas Barnett, the Navy’s New Map in the first term of the Obama administration.
The tactical purpose of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) might be to establish “a multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations,” but the strategic purpose has larger ends. Combined Task Force 150 represents a mostly Western approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The nations that contribute to Task Force 150 are European and North American, but also made up of regional partners including Pakistan. If there is any vision behind Combined Task Force 151, the number one priority of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is to build an Eastern approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Essentially, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight priority from day 1 should be to recruit China, Russia, India, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia into CTF-151, all of whom have already committed ships with the intent to fight piracy. If or when Japan and South Korea send ships, recruit them as well.
The US Navy has absolutely nothing to gain in creating maritime competitions in fighting piracy, indeed the Maritime Strategy is about creating maritime coalitions in dealing with maritime challenges. With the creation of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) the US Navy continues to evolve at the pace of the international community towards the development of a cooperative approach to dealing with the problems in Somalia. The strategy here has been absolutely brilliant in my opinion. By not solving the piracy problem for others, a problem that has no economic impact whatsoever to the United States; by encouraging and assisting coalition partners with existing resources; and by remaining patient but engaged in the slowly evolving political process (UNSCR 1846) the United States Navy now finds itself with the internal infrastructure, regional participants, enabled by evolving international political and legal frameworks, and the right tactical resources to address a maritime nGW problem with an international, coalition approach.
For better or worse, the US Navy’s Maritime Strategy has put the US Navy exactly in the position the maritime strategy states it is designed to do. It is now up to our national leadership, both political and inside the Navy, to close the deal with the opportunities at hand. In this bloggers opinion, there is some irony the success in developing a coalition approach to deal with Somalia will fall to the new Secretary of State, one Hillary Clinton. She, more than anyone, understands the challenges of military activities in Somalia. The question is whether that is an advantage, or a burden in the process. Time will tell.
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